Section II
Opinion of the Majority:
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution provides:
"The Congress shall have Power . . . To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
[p.429] The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.
"The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration. In Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127, Chief Justice Hughes spoke as follows respecting the copyright monopoly granted by Congress, ’The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.’ It is said that reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius." United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their work product. Because this task involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand, our patent and copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly. n10
Notes
n10 In its Report accompanying the comprehensive revision of the Copyright Act in 1909, the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives explained this balance:
"The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings, . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings. . . .
"In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider . . . two questions: First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public; and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under the proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly." H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1909).
[p.430] From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in technology. n11 Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copying equipment - - the printing press -- that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection. n12 Repeatedly, as new developments have [p.431] occurred in this country, it has been the Congress that has fashioned the new rules that new technology made necessary. Thus, long before the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, it was settled that the protection given to copyrights is wholly statutory. Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 661-662 (1834). The remedies for infringement "are only those prescribed by Congress." Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U.S. 123, 151 (1889).
Notes
n11 Thus, for example, the development and marketing of player pianos and perforated rolls of music, see White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908), preceded the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909; innovations in copying techniques gave rise to the statutory exemption for library copying embodied in Section 108 of the 1976 revision of the copyright law; the development of the technology that made it possible to retransmit television programs by cable or by microwave systems, see Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968), and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974), prompted the enactment of the complex provisions set forth in 17 U. S. C. Section 111(d)(2)(B) and Section 111(d)(5) (1982 ed.) after years of detailed congressional study, see Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d 125, 129 (CA2 1982).
By enacting the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, 85 Stat. 391, Congress also provided the solution to the "record piracy" problems that had been created by the development of the audio tape recorder. Sony argues that the legislative history of that Act, see especially H. R. Rep. No. 92-487, p. 7 (1971), indicates that Congress did not intend to prohibit the private home use of either audio or video tape recording equipment. In view of our disposition of the contributory infringement issue, we express no opinion on that question.
n12 "Copyright protection became necessary with the invention of the printing press and had its early beginnings in the British censorship laws. The fortunes of the law of copyright have always been closely connected with freedom of expression, on the one hand, and with technological improvements in means of dissemination, on the other. Successive ages have drawn different balances among the interest of the writer in the control and exploitation of his intellectual property, the related interest of the publisher, and the competing interest of society in the untrammeled dissemination of ideas." Foreword to B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright vii-viii (1967).
The judiciary’s reluctance to expand the protections afforded by the copyright without explicit legislative guidance is a recurring theme. See, e. g., Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); White- Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology.
In a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly marked our course, we must be circumspect in construing the scope of rights created by a legislative enactment which never contemplated such a calculus of interests. In doing so, we are guided by Justice Stewart’s exposition of the correct approach to ambiguities in the law of copyright:
"The limited scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be [p.432] encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ’author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good. ’The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly,’ this Court has said, ’lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.’ Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127. See Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 327-328; Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 218, 241-242. When technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
Copyright protection "subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U. S. C. Section 102(a) (1982 ed.). This protection has never accorded the copyright owner complete control over all possible uses of his work. n13 Rather, the Copyright Act grants the [p.433] copyright holder "exclusive" rights to use and to authorize the use of his work in five qualified ways, including reproduction of the copyrighted work in copies. Section 106. n14 All reproductions of the work, however, are not within the exclusive domain of the copyright owner; some are in the public domain. Any individual may reproduce a copyrighted wor for a "fair use"; the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to such a use. Compare Section 106 with Section 107.
Notes
n13 See, e. g., White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S., at 19; cf. Deep South Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530-531 (1972). While the law has never recognized an author’s right to absolute control of his work, the natural tendency of legal rights to express themselves in absolute terms to the exclusion of all else is particularly pronounced in the history of the constitutionally sanctioned monopolies of the copyright and the patent. See, e. g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156-158 (1948) (copyright owners claiming right to tie license of one film to license of another under copyright law); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932) (copyright owner claiming copyright renders it immune from state taxation of copyright royalties); Bobbs- Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 349-351 (1908) (copyright owner claiming that a right to fix resale price of his works within the scope of his copyright); International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (patentees claiming right to tie sale of unpatented article to lease of patented device).
n14 Section 106 of the Act provides:
"Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
"(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
"(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
"(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
"(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
"(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly."
"Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner," that is, anyone who trespasses into his exclusive domain by using or authorizing the use of the copyrighted work in one of the five ways set forth in the statute, "is an infringer of the copyright." Section 501(a). Conversely, anyone who is authorized by the copyright owner to use the copyrighted work in a way specified in the statute or who makes a fair use of the work is not an infringer of the copyright with respect to such use.
The Copyright Act provides the owner of a copyright with a potent arsenal of remedies against an infringer of his work, including an injunction to restrain the infringer from violating [p.434] his rights, the impoundment and destruction of all reproductions of his work made in violation of his rights, a recovery of his actual damages and any additional profits realized by the infringer or a recovery of statutory damages, and attorney’s fees. Sections 502-505. n15
Notes
n15 Moreover, anyone who willfully infringes the copyright to reproduce a motion picture for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain is subject to substantial criminal penalties, 17 U. S. C. Section 506(a) (1982 ed.), and the fruits and instrumentalities of the crime are forfeited upon conviction, Section 506(b).
The two respondents in this case do not seek relief against the Betamax users who have allegedly infringed their copyrights. Moreover, this is not a class action on behalf of all copyright owners who license their works for television broadcast, and respondents have no right to invoke whatever rights other copyright holders may have to bring infringement actions based on Betamax copying of their works. n16 As was made clear by their own evidence, the copying of the respondents’ programs represents a small portion of the total use of VTR’s. It is, however, the taping of respondents’ own copyrighted programs that provides them with standing to charge Sony with contributory infringement. To prevail, they have the burden of proving that users of the Betamax have infringed their copyrights and that Sony should be held responsible for that infringement.
Notes
n16 In this regard, we reject respondents’ attempt to cast this action as comparable to a class action because of the positions taken by amici with copyright interests and their attempt to treat the statements made by amici as evidence in this case. See Brief for Respondents 1, and n. 1, 6, 52, 53, and n. 116. The stated desires of amici concerning the outcome of this or any litigation are no substitute for a class action, are not evidence in the case, and do not influence our decision; we examine an amicus curiae brief solely for whatever aid it provides in analyzing the legal questions before us.
